/*
 *  TLS 1.3 key schedule
 *
 *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 *
 *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may
 *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
 *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 *  limitations under the License.
 */

#include "common.h"

#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)

#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"

#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>

#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \
    .name = string,

struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = {
    /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one
     * character too long due to the 0-termination. */
    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST
};

#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL

/*
 * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
 *
 * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows:
 *
 * struct HkdfLabel {
 *   uint16 length;            // Length of expanded key material
 *   opaque label<7..255>;     // Always prefixed by "tls13 "
 *   opaque context<0..255>;   // Usually a communication transcript hash
 * };
 *
 * Parameters:
 * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material
 *                   Even though the standard allows expansion to up to
 *                   2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than
 *                   255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most
 *                   255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by
 *                   hardcoding the writing of the high bytes.
 * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix
 *                  The label length MUST be less than or equal to
 *                  MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN
 *                  It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
 *                  All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3
 *                  can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN().
 * - (ctx, clen): context + context length
 *                The context length MUST be less than or equal to
 *                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN
 *                It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
 * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure,
 *        This MUST be a writable buffer of size
 *        at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes.
 * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of
 *         the HkdfLabel structure on success.
 */

static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 ";

#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \
    (2               /* expansion length           */                  \
     + 1             /* label length               */                  \
     + label_len + 1 /* context length             */                  \
     + context_len)

#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN         \
    SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(                \
        sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) +                      \
            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \
        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN)

static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(
    size_t desired_length,
    const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
    const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
    unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen)
{
    size_t total_label_len =
        sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen;
    size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len =
        SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, clen);

    unsigned char *p = dst;

    /* Add the size of the expanded key material.
     * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use
     * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255
#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \
value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN"
#endif

    *p++ = 0;
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((desired_length >> 0) & 0xFF);

    /* Add label incl. prefix */
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(total_label_len & 0xFF);
    memcpy(p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix));
    p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix);
    memcpy(p, label, llen);
    p += llen;

    /* Add context value */
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(clen & 0xFF);

    if (clen != 0) {
        memcpy(p, ctx, clen);
    }

    /* Return total length to the caller.  */
    *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
}

int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(
    mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
    const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
    const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
    const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
    unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
{
    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
    unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN];
    size_t hkdf_label_len;

    if (llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
        /* Should never happen since this is an internal
         * function, and we know statically which labels
         * are allowed. */
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    }

    if (clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) {
        /* Should not happen, as above. */
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    }

    if (blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) {
        /* Should not happen, as above. */
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    }

    md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);

    if (md == NULL) {
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
    }

    ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(blen,
                                 label, llen,
                                 ctx, clen,
                                 hkdf_label,
                                 &hkdf_label_len);

    return (mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md,
                                secret, slen,
                                hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len,
                                buf, blen));
}

/*
 * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
 *
 *  - One secret value per sender.
 *  - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
 *  - The desired lengths of key and IV.
 *
 * The expansion itself is based on HKDF:
 *
 *   [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length )
 *   [sender]_write_iv  = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length )
 *
 * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided
 * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side
 * keys in a single function call.
 */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(
    mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
    const unsigned char *client_secret,
    const unsigned char *server_secret,
    size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len,
    mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys)
{
    int ret = 0;

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
                                               client_secret, slen,
                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key),
                                               NULL, 0,
                                               keys->client_write_key, key_len);

    if (ret != 0) {
        return (ret);
    }

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
                                               server_secret, slen,
                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key),
                                               NULL, 0,
                                               keys->server_write_key, key_len);

    if (ret != 0) {
        return (ret);
    }

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
                                               client_secret, slen,
                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv),
                                               NULL, 0,
                                               keys->client_write_iv, iv_len);

    if (ret != 0) {
        return (ret);
    }

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
                                               server_secret, slen,
                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv),
                                               NULL, 0,
                                               keys->server_write_iv, iv_len);

    if (ret != 0) {
        return (ret);
    }

    keys->key_len = key_len;
    keys->iv_len = iv_len;

    return (0);
}

int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
    mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
    const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
    const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
    const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
    int ctx_hashed,
    unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen)
{
    int ret;
    unsigned char hashed_context[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];

    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
    md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);

    if (md == NULL) {
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
    }

    if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) {
        ret = mbedtls_md(md, ctx, clen, hashed_context);

        if (ret != 0) {
            return (ret);
        }

        clen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);
    } else {
        if (clen > sizeof(hashed_context)) {
            /* This should never happen since this function is internal
             * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly.
             * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk
             * of getting a stack overflow. */
            return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        }

        memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, clen);
    }

    return (mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
                                                 secret, slen,
                                                 label, llen,
                                                 hashed_context, clen,
                                                 dstbuf, buflen));
}

int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret(
    mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
    const unsigned char *secret_old,
    const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
    unsigned char *secret_new)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    size_t hlen, ilen;
    unsigned char tmp_secret[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
    unsigned char tmp_input[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };

    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
    md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg);

    if (md == NULL) {
        return (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
    }

    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);

    /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "")
     * on the old secret. */
    if (secret_old != NULL) {
        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
            hash_alg,
            secret_old, hlen,
            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived),
            NULL, 0, /* context */
            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
            tmp_secret, hlen);

        if (ret != 0) {
            goto cleanup;
        }
    }

    if (input != NULL) {
        memcpy(tmp_input, input, input_len);
        ilen = input_len;
    } else {
        ilen = hlen;
    }

    /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material.
     * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material
     * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */
    ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md,
                               tmp_secret, hlen,
                               tmp_input, ilen,
                               secret_new);

    if (ret != 0) {
        goto cleanup;
    }

    ret = 0;

cleanup:

    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret));
    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input));
    return (ret);
}

#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */